



2011 will see – if all goes according to plan – the most important 
stage yet in the story of Croatia’s relationship with the EU since 1992: 
the signing of the Treaty of Accession between Croatia and the current 27 
Member States of the EU. Over the last 20 years we have moved from the 
EU’s so-called ‘Regional Approach to South-East Europe’ based upon the 
April 1997 Council Conclusions on conditionality,1 to the Stabilisation 
and Association Process launched in 1999,2 the signing of the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement which accepted Croatia as a ‘potential 
candidate’ state in October 2001, and its conclusion in December 2004,3 
Croatia’s application for membership of the EU in March 2003 and its 
acceptance as a candidate state in June 2003, the opening of accession 
negotiations in June 2005 and the formal closing of the negotiations on 
30 June 2011. The European Council in its Conclusions of 23-24 June 
2011 envisages signing the Accession Treaty by the end of 2011, and the 
text of the Treaty was made public in September this year.4 Assuming – 
and it is of course quite an assumption – that all the stages of signature 
and ratification by all parties go smoothly, Croatia will become the 28th 
member of the EU on 1 July 2013. 
The process of this latest enlargement of the EU has been very diffe-
rent from the first enlargements in the 1970s and 1980s. As Hillion has 
pointed out, enlargement has moved from a procedure to a policy. 5 This 
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in itself points to the dual nature of enlargement: as both a policy of the 
Union and as a Treaty of Accession concluded on the EU side by the Mem-
ber States. It has in fact since 19936 become an on-going policy process, 
with a continuing procession of countries accepted as potential candi-
dates and then candidates; currently there are eight countries involved 
in addition to Croatia.7 The two aspects of enlargement are reflected in 
the single Treaty provision which deals with the process, Article 49 TEU. 
The process is highly institutionalised: the application for membership is 
addressed to the Council; the European Council may – a practice codified 
by the Lisbon Treaty – establish ‘conditions of eligibility’; the Commission 
gives a formal opinion and manages the negotiations; the European Par-
liament must consent. But accession itself requires a new Treaty to be 
ratified by all the contracting states. Ultimately each Member State must 
not only agree within the Council but subject the Treaty to national con-
stitutional ratification requirements. Over the years and different enlar-
gements we can see shifts in the balance between these two dimensions. 
Hillion has identified a number of developments in recent years which he 
argues represent an increased level of control by the Member States amo-
unting to a nationalisation, or renationalisation, of enlargement policy: 
the introduction of benchmarks (stricter application of membership crite-
ria); adjustments to the accession procedure by reinterpreting the Article 
49 TFEU rules (for example, by introducing conditionality); the increased 
emphasis on ‘absorption capacity’; and de facto barriers to enlargement 
imposed at (bilateral) national level.
Perhaps the surprising thing is not that enlargement has been (re)
nationalised but that it was de-nationalised, or institutionalised, to the 
extent that it was. We are now perhaps reverting to the position prior to 
the 1990s. For a relatively brief but important period covering the EFTA 
enlargement and the 2004 and 2007 central and eastern European enlar-
gements, during which the process of accession became a policy of enlar-
gement, the emphasis was on the management of enlargement institutio-
nally rather than on the acceptance of a specific accession by each existing 
Member State. This was for a number of reasons: the lack of controversy 
over the EFTA states joining the EU; the fact that the Member States had 
to make a credible political commitment to enlargement to the central and 
eastern European countries in the early 1990s, thus changing the questi-
on from ‘whether’ to ‘when’. The size of the central and eastern European 
enlargement also played a part, the need to demonstrate the objectivity 
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of the (almost technocratic) process as a way of dealing with its intensely 
political nature and its inherently competitive dimension. 
So what has prompted the reversion to a more Member State-driven 
process (I do not want to exaggerate this: it is an adjustment rather than 
an abandonment of the institutionalised policy of 1992-2007)? The group 
of states that are actual or potential candidates is more diverse and the 
attitudes of Member States are more divided than in previous enlarge-
ments. We can also point to so-called enlargement fatigue. All these no 
doubt play a part. But I would like to mention another dimension: I think 
we can see a revival, in a different form, of the ‘widening versus deepe-
ning’ debate.
‘Widening versus deepening’ surfaced as an issue in the early 1990s 
when the fall of the Berlin Wall and massive changes in central and ea-
stern Europe coincided with the pre-Treaty of Maastricht debates about 
Economic and Monetary Union, the creation of the  Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and the new cooperation on migration and crime. It 
was feared by some (and possibly desired by others) that enlargement 
on the scale implied by the commitments being made to the central and 
eastern European countries (and the lack of clarity about which countri-
es would be included in this commitment) would compromise the grand 
projects of deepening political and economic integration that were on the 
table.   However this debate was essentially rather sterile and largely 
rhetorical (since in practice no-one was going to go back from the com-
mitment to enlargement and there were strong pressures favouring the 
Maastricht ‘deepening’ as well) and it rather quickly metamorphosed into 
an argument for ‘deepening because widening’ – in other words, that Tre-
aty reform in the direction of communitarization  – as exemplified by the 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, and then the Constitutional Treaty project 
followed by the Lisbon Treaty – was a necessary adjunct to enlargement. 
One aspect of this concerned an increase in qualified majority voting on 
the grounds that unanimity in a Union of 27+ members would be increa-
singly difficult to manage. Another was the said to be the need for conti-
nuity through a permanent Union Presidency and a High Representative 
for Foreign and Security Policy, taking over many of the functions of the 
rotating national presidencies.
It seems to me that we are now seeing a revived awareness of ‘wide-
ning versus deepening’, but in a different sense. Not in the sense of new 
integration projects that might be put at risk by further enlargements. 
But rather in a renewed understanding of just how much ‘deepening’ our 
actual level of integration entails and that enlargement involves extending 
that integration ever more widely. An understanding that enlargement is 
not just a matter of how many Commissioners or numbers of votes in the 
Council, but implies a tangible commitment to solidarity between Mem-
Xber States.  The financial crisis has brought home just what that commi-
tment might entail as well as the difficulties of managing deep integration 
between countries that are still very different in terms of economic ma-
nagement and performance. The Viking and Laval cases8 have brought 
home the challenges in operating an internal market which includes co-
untries with very different social bargains. Both these examples involve 
impacts on the individual citizen and taxpayer.  Admittedly the countries 
giving rise to anxiety over debt and the euro are long-standing not re-
cently-joined Member States. The point is rather that these events and 
others have brought home the fact that membership of the Union – and 
the admission of new members – carry serious implications.  No wonder 
perhaps that enlargement is being re-politicised and re-nationalised. 
Solidarity, however, has an external as well as an internal dimen-
sion. The EU’s enlargement policy towards central and eastern Europe 
over the last 20 years is not only seen as a successful foreign policy which 
contributes to achieving the broader foreign policy aims of stability and 
security. It has immense political and even psychological significance as 
a ‘return to Europe’ by the central and eastern European states, a reuni-
fication of Europe following the end of the divisions of the Cold War, and 
with significant and problematic potential for redrawing the boundaries 
of – and within – Europe. It thus has significance beyond its current 
membership, and with its explicit conditionality has become an instru-
ment of economic, political and legal change beyond its boundaries. If 
membership is to be an option for all European States and if enlargement 
is to be used as an instrument of Union policy, designed to stabilize 
and restructure Europe, then conditionality –whatever criticism may be 
made in terms of accountability – is a key to its success. The relationship 
between solidarity and conditionality is a complex one, both within the 
context of enlargement policy and – increasingly – within the EU itself.9 
As originally conceived, enlargement conditionality played a gate-keeping 
role, making possible the EU’s internal solidarity based on mutual trust 
and loyalty. The need to establish trust, and not least to establish the 
institutional mechanisms which are the foundation for that trust, is one 
objective of the different elements of the pre-accession process, including 
conditionality. However the 2004 and 2007 enlargements introduced a 
new element into the Accession Treaties, an element which has been 
replicated in the draft Accession Treaty with Croatia, and which accepts 
a continuation of conditionality for a limited period after accession thro-
8 Case C438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I10779; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd [2007] ECR 
I-11767.
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vol. 30, issue 1, 3-22.
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ugh monitoring and the possibility of safeguard measures being taken 
where there is a failure to implement commitments.10  Significantly, this 
importing of conditionality into the internal system of the EU, so that it 
is no longer limited to pre-accession but continues as the complement to 
internal solidarity, is also a defining feature of the EU’s response to the 
most serious crisis in its history. It is clear that applying conditions prior 
to admittance to the euro zone is not enough; a regular and potentially 
intrusive monitoring of domestic economic policy by EU institutions is 
increasingly accepted as inevitable and necessary given the degree of so-
lidarity demanded by monetary union. And this conditionality is not only 
applicable for a limited post-accession period but is becoming entrenched 
into the very conception of membership. The Union that I hope Croatia 
will join in 2013 will look very different from the Union of 1993 or even 
2003.
Florence, November 2011
10 Articles 36, 38 and 39 of the draft Accession Treaty with Croatia (n 4).
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